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The adoption of the Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sourc-
es was an important step for the successive contribution to the global Climate Change Regime as well 
as the diversification of energy supply, thus ensuring energy security and reducing dependence on ex-
ternal suppliers. However, although the Directive sets out legally binding targets for each Member State 
by 2020 as well as interim targets, it does not provide any legally binding instruments, i.e., renewable 
energy support scheme(s), to achieve the above-mentioned objectives.
Since the overall EU target as well as national targets are fairly ambitious, it poses a question, why the 
Directive does not include specific legally binding instrument(s) for achieving these targets, whereas the 
so-called flexibility mechanisms, provided in the Directive, are limited only to non-obligatory cooperation 
between Member States. It is important to mention that, during the negotiation process on the Directive, 
the harmonization of Member States’ renewable energy policies through the EU-level mechanism of 
Guarantees of Origin was widely debated. Therefore, the intergovernmental negotiation on the Directive’s 
provisions on renewable energy support scheme which should allow Member States to achieve their 
national targets as well as the overall EU target shall be submitted as the object of this article, while 
the purpose is to analyze the case of negotiating the EU-level renewable energy support scheme and to 
investigate the intergovernmental factors such as asymmetrical bargaining power of Member States as 
well as specific domestic factors’ influence for the negotiation’s results, applying liberal intergovernmen-
talist approach as the theoretical framework for analysis. The main tasks of the article are: 
 _ to introduce the basic provisions of liberal intergovernmentalism and to formulate principal theoret-
ical assumptions for further empirical analysis; 
 _ to present a compact overview of the support schemes for renewables, applied in the EU;
 _ to define the role of the European Commission in the negotiation process, to determine the positions 
of the Member States on a common support scheme for renewable energy, to analyze the process of 
interest bargaining through coalition-forming and to detect the essential results of the negotiation.
The main methods applied in this article include an analysis of the documents and the Member States’ 
position papers, conducting a case study of the negotiation process on the mechanism of Guarantees 
of Origin as the common EU-wide support scheme for renewables in the Directive 2009/28/EC on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.
The article consists of three parts. The basic provisions of liberal intergovernmentalism as well as 
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the principal theoretical assumptions are examined in the first part of the article as the theoretical 
framework for further empirical analysis. Renewable energy support schemes, applied in the EU, are 
presented in the second part and the case study of the intergovernmental negotiation on the pan-Eu-
ropean support scheme for renewables based on the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin is carried out 
in the third part.
The findings show that the majority of the Member States demonstrated strong opposition to the Euro-
pean Commission’s proposal for harmonizing their renewable energy policies through specific pan-Eu-
ropean support scheme, i.e., the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin. The Commission’s initiative was 
rejected by posing an argument that the instruments for reaching the renewable energy targets must be 
selected according to the principal of subsidiarity with respect to each Member State’s national specifics 
as only under these circumstances renewable energy support schemes could function in the most suf-
ficient and effective manner. Therefore, the Commission‘s initial proposal had to be significantly modi-
fied thus abandoning the idea of the EU-level support scheme for renewables. The findings also verify 
theoretical assumptions based on liberal intergovernmentalism which postulate that the negotiation’s 
results mainly depend on asymmetric bargaining power and the most powerful Member States’ prefer-
ences determined by their national specifics, support schemes and other domestic factors. 
KEYWORDS: renewable energy support schemes; mechanism of Guarantees of Origin; renewable 
energy policy harmonization; intergovernmental negotiation; EU Member States’ national preferences.
Since the very end of the 20th century, the European Commission has frequently criticized the 
highly fragmented variety of support schemes across the EU and has been urging the Member 
States to turn towards a stable, unified EU-wide support mechanism for renewables (Jacobs, 
2012). 
The latest effort to harmonize the renewable energy support schemes can be seen in the negoti-
ation process on the Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources, reflecting the Commission’s proposal for the harmonized mechanism of Guarantees of 
Origin. However, this effort was rejected by the Member States.
The aforementioned situation poses the question regarding the reasons for the unwillingness 
of the Member States to accept the Commission’s proposal for joint instrument, i.e., a common 
support scheme for renewables, during the negotiation process on the Directive. Therefore, to 
answer this question, two main assumptions will be made and tested in the further analysis.
Firstly, the outcomes of the EU-level negotiations depend on the Member States’ bargaining 
power as well as on the national preferences of the most powerful Member States. Consequent-
ly, the main purpose here will be to track the coalition-forming processes during the negotiation 
as well as to identify the interests of different Member States and to analyze the process of inter-
est coordination by exposing the so-called „winners“ and „losers“ of the negotiation.
Secondly, the functions of supranational institutions in the policy-making process are strictly lim-
ited to the initiation and coordination of political agenda as they are almost unable to participate in 
the decision-making process without the support of the most powerful Member States. Therefore, 
these institutions are forced to give up their initiatives or to make the significant amendments which 
match the positions of the most powerful Member States. Here the main purpose will be to assess 
the Member States’ potential to remove the Commission‘s proposals from the political agenda or to 
reduce them to a level which does not pose threats to their national interests.
Therefore, the intergovernmental negotiation on the Directive’s provisions on renewable energy 
support scheme which should allow Member States to achieve their national targets as well 
as the overall EU target shall be submitted as the object of this article, while the purpose is to 
analyze the case of negotiating EU-level renewable energy support scheme and to investigate 
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the intergovernmental factors such as the asymmetrical bargaining power of the Member States 
as well as the specific domestic factors’ influence for the negotiation’s results, applying liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach as the theoretical framework for further analysis. The main tasks 
of the article are: 
 _ to introduce the basic provisions of liberal intergovernmentalism and to formulate principal 
theoretical assumptions for further empirical analysis;
 _ to present a compact overview of the support schemes for renewables, applied in the EU;
 _ to define the role of the European Commission in the negotiation process, to determine the 
positions of the Member States on a common support scheme for renewable energy, to an-
alyze the process of interest bargaining through coalition-forming and to detect the essential 
results of the negotiation.
The main methods applied in this article include an analysis of the documents and the Member 
States’ position papers, conducting a case study of the negotiation process on the mechanism of 
Guarantees of Origin as the common EU-wide support scheme for renewables in the Directive 
2009/28/EC.
The article shall consist of three parts. The basic provisions of liberal intergovernmentalism as 
well as the principal theoretical assumptions shall be examined in the first part of the article as 
the theoretical framework for further empirical analysis. Renewable energy support schemes, 
applied in the EU, shall be presented in the second part and the case study of intergovernmental 
negotiation on the pan-European support scheme for renewables based on the mechanism of 
Guarantees of Origin shall be carried out in the third part.
Prior to the analysis, it is necessary to mention that only a few academic papers and me-
dia articles analyze the negotiation process on renewable energy policy as well as the Mem-
ber States‘ positions on these issues. Moreover, even the scientific articles usually examine 
only the Climate part of the negotiation process on the Climate and Energy package for 2020, 
paying very little attention to the renewable energy issues, e.g., the provisions of the Directive 
2009/28/EC. One of the reasons for this may be that the detailed positions of the Member Sta-
tes in the intergovernmental negotiation are of limited  public availability, while some of them 
are entirely inaccessible and classified by the national authorities due to national security is-
sues. However, the majority of the Member States’ positions on the mechanism of Guarantees 
of Origin, i.e., the common EU-wide support scheme for renewables (analyzed further in this 
article), are reflected in the documents of the General Secretariat of the Council.
Liberal intergovernmentalist theory emphasizes the vital interests as well as the preferences 
of the Member States as the main stimulus for their integration. According to the postulates of 
this theory, the Member States seek the best possible outcome which matches their national 
interests during the process of intergovernmental negotiation. In order to verify this assump-
tion, the analysis of the Member States‘ positions on the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin, 
set out in the Commission’s proposal for the Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use 
of renewable energy, will be carried out to identify their preferences and national interests.
Currently, the intergovernmental theories based on realist assumptions are dominant in the studies of 
European integration. From an intergovernmental theory perspective, the EU integration process may 
be defined by the following provisions, which also reflects the criticism of  (neo)functionalist theory.
Firstly, the Member States are the main actors determining the scale and speed of sovereignty 
delegation to the supranational authorities, while supranational institutions should be perceived 
as agents controlled by the Member States, with no actual decision-making prerogatives, except in 
the cases when these institutions are supported by the large and most powerful Member States. 
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Secondly, in contrast to the postulates of (neo)functionalist theory, the political and economic union 
is not self-sustained and an inevitable process. Thirdly, the integration is possible only on the so-
called routine issues on daily basis, which can be determined as matters of low-politics, where 
conflicts based on Member States’ vital national interests are less likely to occur.
Realistic or classical intergovernmental theoretical approach particularly emphasizes the im-
portance of nation-states and their impact on the processes of integration. The theory is based 
on the core (neo)realist principles, i.e., the anarchistic nature of international system which 
consists of formally and functionally equal elements, i.e., nation-states (Rosamond, 2000). In 
this case, the focus should be placed on the distribution of power between the units, i.e., the 
nation-states, while the distribution of power should be described by analyzing how much 
influence or power the particular state A has on the particular state B (Ibid.). In this way, the 
interstate cooperation is often perceived as complicated, for nation-states, as rational actors, 
always seek to maximize their gains, while the interests followed by respective actions of the 
most powerful actors determine the whole nature of the international system (Ibid.).
Classical intergovernmental theory perceives the nation-states as the main actors who influence su-
pranational institutions, maintain autonomy and defend their national interests (Richardson, 2006). In 
this regard, supranational institutions do not weaken the sovereignty of nation-states. On the contrary, 
they serve its maintenance so the suppression of national interests for the common international co-
operation remains unlikely. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish two forms of cooperation, i.e., the 
one on collective issues on daily basis within the framework of routine or low policy matters and the 
one on strategic high policy issues which would always be limited by opposing vital national interests. 
Consequently, the principles of (neo)functionalist theory, such as the spill-over effects, fostering the 
integration, may only be actualized or implemented in the framework of low politics.
In the early phase of its development, the intergovernmental theory was based on the assump-
tion that the Member States have fixed preferences or national interests based on geopolitical 
constellations, and the integration is highly determined by the realization of national interests. 
The classical intergovernmental theory was later modified, resulting in a newly evolved liberal in-
tergovernmentalist approach, considered to be one of the dominant theoretical tools of European 
integration studies. A.Moravcsik is universally recognized as the founder and the prime scholar 
of this approach, clearly conceptualizing the issues of national preferences’ formation and thus 
developing the classical intergovernmentalism into a multi-level theory.
Liberal intergovernmentalism suggests that the course and the results of intergovernmental ne-
gotiations (as well as the integration process itself) are determined by domestic policy matters 
and based on three fundamental principles: the assumption regarding the rational nature of the 
state, the scheme of preference-formation, based on the postulates of liberalism, according to 
which the preferences are influenced by various domestic actors, and the analysis of intergovern-
mental negotiation (Moravcsik, 1993).
Contrary to the classical theory of intergovernmentalism which emphasized the importance of 
geopolitical interests, the liberal approach by A.Moravcsik stresses the significance of states’ 
economic interests in the preference-shaping process. However, liberal intergovernmentalism 
retains the fundamental principles of classical intergovernmental theory as both theories recog-
nize that the Member States are the fundamental actors in the EU-level negotiations and that the 
power of supranational institutions in this respect is highly limited. The results of negotiations in 
this case depend on the relative power of the Member States as well as on the intensity of their 
national preferences (Pollack, 2000).
A.Moravcsik suggests a three-stage model of international negotiation which encompasses the 
formation of national preferences, the process of intergovernmental negotiations and the dele-
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gation of sovereignty to the authorities higher than national-level, i.e., supranational institutions 
(Laursen, 2008). In the first stage, national preferences are formed as a result of competition be-
tween domestic interest groups, which eventually are represented by the state in intergovernmen-
tal negotiation process. The state-public relations are of particular importance in this stage, as 
foreign policy is highly dependent on public society and various interest groups (Moravcsik, 1997). 
In the second stage of international negotiation, national preferences aggregated domestically 
are transferred to the international level, where the states seek the realization of their vital na-
tional interests by exploiting a variety of strategies and techniques. The stage of intergovernmen-
tal negotiation is based on three key theoretical assumptions. 
Firstly, the negotiation process is a nonviolent, voluntary action, i.e., the parties have full power 
to reject an agreement which would be less useful than unilateral decision. Secondly, the par-
ties are provided with all the necessary information regarding each other’s national preferences. 
Thirdly, the outcome of the negotiation and the distribution of benefit is determined by the bar-
gaining power of the parties, which depends on the relative value  provided by particular party 
to the particular agreement as compared with the best results of alternative policies; in other 
words, the bargaining power arises from the asymmetry of the Member States’ preference in-
tensity (Moravcsik. 1999).
The third stage of A.Moravcsik’s model encompasses the delegation of sovereignty to supra-
national institutions in two ways. Firstly, in the case of pooling sovereignty, states are prone to 
dealing with a number of issues by means other than unanimity, e.g., by qualified majority voting. 
Secondly, in the case of delegating sovereignty, the decision-making prerogative is assigned to 
the supranational institutions, e.g., the European Commission or the European Court of Justice, 
without states’ intervention or unilateral veto decisions (Ibid.). In this case, the decision-making 
efficiency increases, but the parties’ abilities to control the process decline. Alternatively, in the 
former case of pooling sovereignty, parties are less likely to lose control over decision-making, 
though a problem of inefficiency occurs.
Having assessed the notions, posed by A.Moravcsik that the results of intergovernmental ne-
gotiations are determined by the differences in states’ bargaining power as well as asymmetric 
interdependence, it can be assumed that such negotiations determine “winners” and “losers”. The 
most powerful Member States have more options to shape the EU policies by uploading their 
national interests to the international level, thus imposing their preferences on the relatively less 
powerful Member States which can be perceived only as EU policy downloaders or takers.
The existence of above-mentioned roles, such as policy uploaders or shapers, i.e., the most pow-
erful Member States, and policy downloaders or takers, i.e., Member States possessing relatively 
weaker bargaining power, also offers an answer to why the integration within the domains of 
certain EU policies is often described as highly fragmented because of particular disparities. The 
powerful Member States actively support the idea of integration on certain issues, while the 
Member States with relatively weaker bargaining power are sometimes reluctant to implement 
the international commitments imposed on them during the negotiations. Two main assump-
tions which are essentially based on liberal intergovernmentalist theory will be discussed in this 
article for the purpose on the EU renewable energy policy.
Firstly, the outcomes of the EU-level negotiations depend on the Member States’ bargaining 
power as well as on the national preferences of the most powerful Member States. Consequent-
ly, the main purpose here will be to track the coalition-forming processes during the negotiation 
as well as to identify the national interests of different Member States and analyze the process of 
interest coordination by exposing the so-called “winners” and “losers” of the negotiation.
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Secondly, the functions of supranational institutions in the policy-making process are strictly lim-
ited to the initiation and coordination of political agenda, as they are almost unable to participate in 
the decision-making processes without the support of the most powerful Member States. There-
fore, these institutions are forced to give up their initiatives or to make the significant amendments 
which would match the positions of the most powerful Member States. Here the main purpose will 
be to assess the Member States’ potential to remove the Commission’s proposals from the political 
agenda or to reduce them to a level which does not pose threats to their national interests.
In order to test these assumptions, the intergovernmental negotiations as well as the Member 
States’ bargaining positions on the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin, proposed by the Euro-
pean Commission as the EU-wide support scheme for renewables in order to harmonize the 
renewable energy policies within the EU, will be further analyzed in this article.
Since the very start of the development of renewable energy, it demanded a certain amount of 
financial support from the state, so some renewable energy promotion instruments, i.e., the 
support schemes, eventually emerged. The European Commission emphasizes two groups of 
support instruments which encompass the instruments focused on the price, i.e., feed-in tariff 
schemes, and the quantity-oriented instruments, i.e., quota and the green certificate system as 
well as the scheme of auctions and tendering (Jacobs, 2012). However, it should be noted that 
the spectrum of support schemes applied in the EU has now expanded to include a broad variety 
of modifications as well as some hybrid models. The most common renewable energy support 
schemes in the EU range from the so-called feed-in and feed-in premium tariffs to auction and 
tendering scheme for renewable energy quota allocation, quota and the green certificate system 
and other support instruments, such as investment support, tax exemptions, soft loans, etc.
The feed-in tariff scheme is applied in the vast majority of the EU Member States (Canton & 
Johannesson Linden, 2010). The Member States using the latter support scheme commit to 
support renewable energy by establishing long-term feed-in tariffs. In this case, renewable en-
ergy producers receive a fixed amount per unit of energy for a fixed period of time, regardless 
of the energy market price. It is considered that the feed-in tariff is the most favorable support 
scheme for a steady development as well as a promotion of renewables, since it ensures stable 
income flows for producers and investors and allows them to clearly predict the payback periods 
of renewable energy projects (Held, et. al., 2014). As a result, it becomes easier to convince the 
creditors to grant loans, which also guarantees a stable development of renewable energy.
Feed-in premium support scheme functions quite similarly to the feed-in tariff, but in this case 
the renewable energy is traded on the market and its producers receive a fixed premium to the 
market price, which goes as a fixed amount or as a changing amount depending on the market 
price fluctuations (Ibid.).
For the above-mentioned reasons, the feed-in tariffs are considered as the most effective sup-
port schemes in the EU by a broad consensus of Member States, investors, producers and the 
scientific community (Haas, et. al., 2001; Haas, et. al., 2004; Reich & Bechberger, 2004; Held, et. 
al., 2006; Ringel, 2006; Lauber, 2007; Haas, et. al., 2011).
The auction and tendering scheme is applied with the purpose of allocating quotas for renew-
able energy by announcing calls for tenders. In this case, the tender winners are provided with 
quotas as well as feed-in tariffs for a defined period of time. The latter support scheme usually 
requires that (potential) competitors, i.e., auction participants, meet certain criteria, e.g., finan-
cial guarantees for renewable energy projects, penalties for delays of project implementation 
or non-implementation, etc., in order to reduce the number of potential tender participants 
on purpose to retain only those market players with the sufficient technological, financial and 
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other resources (Held, et. al., 2014). It is argued that the effectiveness of auction and tendering 
support scheme depends on the specific terms of the auction, the attractiveness of the renew-
able energy market for potential investors as well as the prospects of economic growth, the 
number and the special characteristics of tender participants and other factors.
In the case of a quota or green certificate support schemes, various entities operating within the 
state must use renewable energy by producing or purchasing it from other entities or by acquir-
ing the so-called green certificates. Here renewable energy producers receive the green certifi-
cates from state authorities, which can be sold to other energy producers who are committed to 
produce a certain quota of renewable energy. It is argued that the main advantage of this scheme 
is its compatibility with the principles of the market as well as competitive energy prices, though 
it should be noted that the use of green certificates may increase the overall costs of renewable 
energy policy implementation when energy prices are unstable (Ibid.).
The feed-in tariff schemes focus on the specifics of renewable energy technologies, so they can 
be intended to support a wide range of technologies, while the quota or green certificate support 
schemes do not take into account technological specifics and they are intended to support the 
least competitive technologies or sources of renewable energy as well as large-scale projects. 
This may explain why the efforts to unify support schemes in the EU by their harmonization on 
the basis of the quota scheme have received opposition from those Member States who oppose 
the centralization in the energy sector as well as resistance from small renewable energy market 
participants (Jacobs, 2012).
It should be mentioned that there have been some efforts to harmonize renewable energy sup-
port schemes on the EU level, though these efforts still remain unimplemented due to strong 
reluctance from the majority of the Member States. The first harmonization initiatives appeared 
in The Green Paper of 1996, in which the European Commission criticized the fragmented and 
fast-changing support schemes in the EU Member States, encouraging them to move towards 
a unified and stable EU-wide scheme (Ibid.). In 1997, the Parliament published their opinion, 
urging for an EU-wide application of a feed-in tariff scheme, whereas the Commission supported 
a quota scheme, since the feed-in tariff was less competitive compared to the quota scheme, 
according to the Commission’s judgements (Ibid.). However, the diversity of support schemes for 
renewables across the EU was retained, legally resulting in the Directive 2001/77/EC on the pro-
motion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market, 
with no specific provisions regarding the application of particular support scheme(s) (European 
Parliament, European Council, 2001).
What is more, the assessment of the Member States’ progress on the implementation of the 
targets set out in the Directive 2001/77/EC, accomplished by the European Commission in 2004 
and 2006, estimated that respectively only four and three Member States managed to meet their 
commitments, as most of them applied a feed-in tariff to reach their national renewable electric-
ity targets (Jacobs, 2012). Yet another attempt to harmonize renewable energy support schemes 
followed during the negotiation process on the Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use 
of energy from renewable sources, amending and subsequently repealing the Directive 2001/77/
EC, but this initiative also ultimately failed.
The Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources is ge-
nerally acknowledged as one of the central legal acts in the field of renewable energy legislation. 
However, although the Directive sets legally binding targets for each Member State by 2020 as 
well as interim targets, it still does not provide any legally binding instruments, i.e., renewable 
energy support scheme(s), to achieve the aforementioned objectives (European Parliament, Eu-
ropean Council, 2009).
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Since the overall EU target as well as national targets are fairly ambitious, it poses a question 
why the Directive does not include specific legally binding instrument(s) for achieving these tar-
gets, whereas the so-called flexibility mechanisms provided in the Directive are limited only to 
non-obligatory cooperation between the Member States. It is important to mention that, during 
the negotiation process on the Directive, the harmonization of Member States’ renewable energy 
policies through EU-level mechanism of Guarantees of Origin was widely debated. However, de-
spite the fact that the agreement on EU-wide as well as legally binding national renewable energy 
targets was reached by the Member States, they were quite reluctant to accept the Commision’s 
proposal on a common instrument for reaching those targets, i.e., the mechanism of Guarantees 
of Origin, in order to protect their national support schemes which match their national specifics 
according to the principle of subsidiarity.
As liberal intergovernmentalist theory pays as much attention to supranational institutions as they 
serve the interests of the Member States, supranational authorities’ (in particular, the European 
Commission) main function mainly encompasses the agenda-setting prerogatives. The Member 
States delegate their sovereignty to the Commission in particular policy areas, such as renewable 
energy policy, to define the direction and to institutionalize the outcomes of negotiation process. 
The existence of the Commission reduces the number of proposals submitted for consideration as 
well as the so-called transaction costs and makes further negotiation process more efficient. Thus, 
the main function of the Commission in many cases as well as in this particular case is the political 
agenda-setting through formulation of particular proposals, which Member States can accept or 
reject during the negotiation process. In the case of the negotiation on renewable energy support 
scheme in the Directive 2009/28/EC, the main role of the Commission was to introduce the initial 
proposal on the Guarantees of Origins for the negotiation process, as it was seeking (at least) par-
tial harmonization of the EU renewable energy support schemes, and to monitor the implementa-
tion of the Directive, which can be perceived as the negotiation’s outcome.
A wide range of permanent as well as ad hoc Member States’ coalitions can be seen while re-
searching the processes of various international negotiations. Most commonly, the coalitions, 
particularly in the field of energy policy, are based on the distinction between the so-called new 
Member States (joined the EU in 2004 and afterwards) and old Member States. According to the 
theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, intergovernmental negotiations are also usually char-
acterized by classical distinction between the most powerful large Member States and the pe-
riphery Member States. Some other distinctions depending on the location, size and economic 
power of Member States’ exist as well. Therefore, one of the purposes of this case study will 
be to identify the structure of coalitions during the process of intergovernmental negotiation on 
renewable energy support scheme, i.e., the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin.
As one of the central issues of the negotiation on the Directive 2009/28/EC was the Commis-
sion’s efforts to harmonize the Member States’ renewable energy support schemes through 
the above-mentioned mechanism, this issue caused most disputes and disagreement among 
the Member States. It should be noted that, speaking in terms of liberal intergovernmentalism, 
Member States opposing the Commission’s proposal to harmonize the renewable energy poli-
cies across the EU through the universal mechanism of Guarantees of Origin became the “win-
ners” in the negotiation. The latter mechanism can be described as an EU-wide harmonized 
support scheme, by its nature very similar to the quota or green certificate support scheme, 
which also formally proves that a certain unit of energy is produced from renewable sources 
(Jacobs, 2012). The latter mechanism was initiated to help Member States cover their short-
ages of renewable energy by buying the certificates of Guarantees of Origin from each other if 
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they failed to reach their national targets (Ibid.). Trading the latter certificates between opera-
tors was also set out in the proposal and widely debated during the negotiation.
While assessing the issue of the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin, it can be noted that the 
contradiction between the Member States in the negotiation process was determined by the 
variety of national support schemes. The Member States which apply feed-in tariffs as well 
as small and medium-sized renewable energy companies advocated for the right of individual 
Member States to apply national support schemes according to their own discretion (Ydersbond, 
2012). It is worth to mention that, prior to the official Commission’s proposal, the abandonment 
of national support schemes such as feed-in tariffs and replacing them with a legally binding 
trade-based system was debated, but the proposal was amended, allowing an optional trading 
system, where national feed-in tariffs would still be allowed (Ibid.). The legally binding obligation 
for Guarantees of Origin certificate trading when particular Member States fail to reach their in-
terim national renewable energy targets figured in the early draft of the Commission’s proposal, 
but this provision was eventually removed by joint efforts of such feed-in tariffs’ proponents as 
Germany, Spain and their allies (Dzionara, 2014; “Endsreport”, 2008). 
After the presentation of the proposal in January 2008, the process of negotiation began at the 
European Council and immediately a disagreement occurred among the Member States over the 
relationship between the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin and the national support schemes, 
especially the feed-in tariff, therefore, the Member States applying feed-in tariffs, particularly the 
above-mentioned EU renewable energy leaders Germany and Spain, were very reluctant regard-
ing the common support mechanism (Dzionara, 2014). The opposing Member States’ positions 
reflected a strong contradiction, especially regarding the state-controlled trading in Guarantees 
of Origin. The reluctance towards the common support scheme was based on fears that the 
mechanism of Guarantees of Origin may lead to the eventual top-down harmonization of Mem-
ber States’ renewable energy policies through the total abandonment of the national support 
schemes (as it is widely recognized that sooner or later the EU will have to regulate national 
support schemes (Delgado Piqueras, 2012)).
Finally, taking into account the pressure on the national level, the UK altered its position on Guar-
antees of Origin from positive to rather skeptical. This resulted in the joint statement of Germany, 
Poland and the UK which offered a reduction of Guarantees of Origin from EU-wide support 
scheme to a simple formal tool, which solely proves that the origin of energy is of renewable 
nature, as well as a number of the so-called flexibility mechanisms which should help Member 
States meet their renewable energy targets, i.e., voluntary cooperation between the Member 
States by trading or joint projects in the field of renewable energy (Dzionara, 2014; Nilsson, et. al., 
2009). This change in UK’s position in the very beginning of the negotiation came as a surprise to 
Member States with a strong reluctance towards the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin, such 
as Germany and Spain (Jacobs, 2012).
At first the UK stated in its position that the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin may be eco-
nomically efficient and could help achieve the renewable energy targets, together with national 
support schemes (General Secretariat of the Council. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: 
Policy debate. Contribution from the United Kingdom, 2008). However, later some doubts were 
expressed that the mechanism is already criticized by some Member States for its potential 
“legal uncertainty” and the possible negative outcomes for national support schemes (General 
Secretariat of the Council. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution 
from Denmark and the United Kingdom, 2008). The United Kingdom claimed that the latter 
criticism may be perceived as reasonable and stressed that the flexible and efficient alternative 
proposal shall be introduced together with other Member States (Ibid.).
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Poland also showed concerns regarding the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin, suggesting that it 
could only operate as an additional instrument next to national renewable energy support schemes. 
Otherwise, the renewable energy sector investment climate would be challenged by threats to its 
stability, the efficient operation of existing support schemes would be disrupted and even the im-
plementation of the EU’s renewable energy targets could be jeopardized (General Secretariat of 
the Council. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution from Poland, 2008). 
In its bargaining position on the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin, Germany stated that just 
as important as quantitative renewable energy targets are adequate support schemes (Gener-
al Secretariat of the Council. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution 
from Germany, 2008). Germany posed its rather negative attitude toward Guarantees of Origin 
certificate trading by pointing out that, although this mechanism could help minimize the burden 
on the Member States, there is a need for discussion on the application of the mechanism and 
its coordination with the national renewable energy support schemes, especially feed-in tariff, 
as another option for reaching the renewable energy targets, according to Germany, would be 
the cooperation between the Member States, increasing flexibility and maintaining competitive 
and time-tested national support schemes at the same time (Ibid.). Germany also showed strong 
reluctance regarding Guarantees of Origin certificate trading between operators, as such trade 
would be difficult to implement due to legal as well as other issues (Ibid.).
In its position paper, Spain stated that there is no need for strict binding measures, given the 
geographical, social, economic and energy diversity as well as other aspects of national specif-
ics of the Member States. Therefore, the subsidiarity principle must be applied when adopting 
support schemes for renewables. “Spain, along with Germany and other countries, represents 
a case of success (in terms of renewable energy penetration, creation of technological struc-
ture, a fall in the learning curve towards competitive costs, etc.), and both countries exemplify 
the use of the feed-in tariff system of support for renewables”, so “we must ensure that the 
use of flexibility mechanisms to meet the targets does not undermine the operation of suc-
cessful practical support systems, such as feed-in tariffs“ (General Secretariat of the Council. 
Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution from Spain, 2008).
Greece stressed the need to take into account a variety of specific national aspects of the Mem-
ber States as well as the need to protect and develop the competitiveness of energy sector. In 
its position paper, Greece suggests that Member States should continue applying a variety of 
renewable energy support schemes, particularly the feed-in tariff, which has been already tested 
in many Member States and has demonstrated high efficiency (General Secretariat of the Council. 
Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution from Greece, 2008). Addition-
ally, it is stated that the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin could harmonize the Member States’ 
support schemes and work efficiently only in a single European electricity market, but such a 
market “is not yet the case in the current transitional period in which we have many different 
national electricity markets and prices in the EU”  (Ibid.).
Cyprus stated that it has strong doubts regarding the efficiency of Guarantees of Origin certificate trad-
ing as well as the added value and cost-effectiveness of the mechanism (General Secretariat of the 
Council. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution from Cyprus, 2008).
In its bargaining position, Portugal welcomed such Commission’s proposals as national rene-
wable energy action plans and the interim renewable energy targets, but it also emphasized that 
the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin is not a sufficient renewable energy incentive and stre-
ssed its focus on feed-in tariff as well as other support schemes, such as lower taxes and other 
benefits for renewable energy (General Secretariat of the Council. Climate - Energy Legislative 
Package: Policy debate. Contribution from Portugal, 2008). 
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Belgium acknowledged that renewable energy targets for 2020 are ambitious, but noted that 
flexible instruments are necessary alongside the national targets. (General Secretariat of the 
Council. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution from Belgium, 2008). 
In objection to the Commission’s proposal, Belgium mentioned its doubts about the effectiveness 
of the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin (Ibid.).
Finland’s position paper emphasized that the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin is more com-
patible with the green certificates support scheme, but is less suitable for the Member States 
using the feed-in tariff (General Secretariat of the Council. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: 
Policy debate. Contribution from Finland, 2008). Finland did not support Guarantees of Origin 
certificate trading between operators as it envisaged national risks, stating that the mechanism 
should not impair the existing national support schemes as well as the Member States’ abilities 
to ensure secure and sustainable energy supplies (Ibid.).
In its position, Denmark stated that it expects a stronger commitment of the Member States to 
promote renewable energy production and consumption, and stressed that it would show support 
to the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin only if it functioned alongside the national renewable 
energy support schemes. Denmark was in favor of a system functioning according to the principles 
of the market, in which the Member States could voluntary reject the mechanism so that it would 
not jeopardize the national support schemes (General Secretariat of the Council. Climate - Energy 
Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution from Denmark ant the United Kingdom, 2008).
Sweden emphasized the importance of avoiding a strict set of rules for the development of re-
newable energy, as the development would become more complicated for this reason (General 
Secretariat of the Council. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution from 
Sweden, 2008). Sweden claimed that the effective national control mechanisms are necessary in 
order to reach national targets as well as an overall EU target, taking into account the national 
priorities of the Member States (Ibid.). In other words, each Member State must have the right 
to independently select and apply renewable energy support schemes that are most compati-
ble with their national specifics. The Swedish Government doubts if this mechanism could en-
sure stable investments in the renewable energy sector, and stresses that the application of the 
mechanism requires a deeper analysis as well as further discussion (Ibid.).
Assessing the Commission’s proposals on the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin, Estonia ex-
pressed doubts whether this mechanism should be applied equally to both electricity and heat 
sectors, emphasizing the fact that the latter sector differs from electricity sector by its nature, so 
a uniform mechanism for both sectors should benefit heat producers more (General Secretariat 
of the Council. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution from Estonia, 
2008). It was also noted that the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin is not strictly necessary if 
national support schemes work effectively and are beneficial to investors.
The French position emphasized that the French Presidency of the Council at the time will make 
all the necessary efforts and pay special attention to Europe’s energy security as well as the 
adoption of the Directive and it will certainly be a priority to the French Presidency (General Sec-
retariat of the Council. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution from 
France, 2008). Assessing the proposal on the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin, similarly to 
many other Member States, France’s point of view was that this mechanism should not contra-
dict the existing and effectively functioning national support schemes, as it emphasized that the 
mechanism must be strictly controlled in order to allow the Member States to stimulate the use 
of renewable energy by feed-in tariffs (Ibid.).
The position paper of Romania regarding the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin reflected a 
neutral point of view as Romania held a relatively moderate position, offering to improve the 
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proposal by introducing some clarity into this issue, particularly on the transfer of certificates of 
Guarantees of Origin between the Member States. (General Secretariat of the Council. Climate - 
Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution from Romania, 2008). 
In its position, Lithuania noted that the Directive will require significant efforts by the Member 
States to achieve the targets set for renewable energy. Lithuania also stated that the Member 
States have different renewable energy potentials as well as different economic opportunities for 
renewable energy development. Therefore, the efficient and flexible mechanism is necessary for 
the implementation of the targets, as that would ensure that they are reached in the most com-
petitive manner in terms of price. Lithuania thus considered that the mechanism of Guarantees 
of Origin is the most competitive and flexible way to achieve the aforementioned purposes (Gen-
eral Secretariat of the Council. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution 
from Lithuania, 2008). Its position also suggested that the harmonization of renewable energy 
support schemes at EU level would be too early, as it would harm the investors and adversely 
affect the obligations of the Member States to such investors. As a result, the Member States 
should maintain the existing support schemes and should complement them with the mecha-
nism of Guarantees of Origin (Ibid.).
The Slovak Republic also expressed strong support for the mechanism, as it believed that a com-
mon support scheme reflects solidarity between the Member States. The Slovak Republic also 
noted in its position that during the process of negotiation it would endeavor to clear rules and 
minimum legal-administrative barriers to the application of the mechanism (General Secretariat 
of the Council. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy Debate. Contribution from Slovak 
Republic, 2008).
Hungary also supported the Commission’s proposal as a flexible, competitive and invest-
ment-promoting instrument for achieving national targets, which would enable the Member 
States to reduce their burden, but stressed that the national control of the mechanism of Guaran-
tees of Origin requires clear and strict rules (General Secretariat of the Council. Climate - Energy 
Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution from Hungary, 2008).
Bulgaria expressed support for the Commission’s proposal on the mechanism of Guarantees of 
Origin in its position, and noted that this would be the most effective instrument of direct invest-
ment for reaching the targets (General Secretariat of the Council. Climate - Energy Legislative 
Package: Policy debate. Contribution from Bulgaria, 2008). Bulgaria also stressed that renewable 
technologies require huge initial investments and create a considerable risk to investors, and 
this consequently requires stable and transparent instruments for long-term investment. Con-
sequently, in its position paper, Bulgaria emphasized the importance of the economic efficiency 
of renewable energy, i.e., the lowest possible price (Ibid.).
Probably the most obvious opinion on the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin came from Italy. 
Italy strongly advocated for the harmonization of support schemes based on the mechanism 
of Guarantees of Origin (with some exceptions related to the effectiveness of this mechanism 
in the case of interim targets) as it campaigned for the application of the mechanism not only 
within the EU, but also between the EU and third countries (General Secretariat of the Coun-
cil. Climate - Energy Legislative Package: Policy debate. Contribution from Italy, 2008). In its 
position, Italy stated that in order to achieve the maximum cost-effectiveness in the sector of 
renewables, it is necessary to harmonize the Member States’ support schemes (Ibid.). 
Assessing the negotiation process on the common EU-level mechanism of Guarantees of Or-
igin, it can be noted that this issue revealed deep disagreements between the Member States 
on the Commission’s efforts to harmonize their renewable energy support schemes through 
the joint mechanism. The Commission’s proposal was eventually rejected by the joint efforts of 
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Germany, Spain, Portugal, France, Poland, the UK and other Member States. However, a certain 
degree of flexibility, given the cooperation between Member States as well as joint projects and 
international trade, has been maintained in the final text of the Directive, although the pan-Eu-
ropean mechanism of Guarantees of Origin was rejected as it posed threats to the existing na-
tional support schemes. Therefore, the attempts for the Member States’ renewable energy policy 
harmonization failed once again. Those Member States which remained negative regarding the 
common support scheme and were actively seeking to preserve their national support schemes 
(particularly Germany, Spain, Portugal and others) became the “winners” in the negotiation, in 
terms A.Moravcik. The outcomes of the negotiation process were a very accurate representation 
of the main notion of liberal intergovernmentalism that the integration in particular is based 
on the logics of economic interests, so it could unfold and take place only until violations of the 
Member States’ vital national interests occur. In this case, the Member States’ integration into the 
field of renewable energy policy was hindered by the efforts of the Member States to protect the 
most economically advantageous, time-tested national support schemes, according to a variety 
of specific economic as well as energy domestic parameters. However, from the perspective 
of intergovernmentalism, this phase of the negotiation process resulted in reaching the lowest 
common denominator, partially satisfying all parties involved by rejecting the harmonization of 
support schemes through the mechanism Guarantees of Origin and replacing it with the alterna-
tives of voluntary Member States’ cooperation in the renewable energy sector as well as offering 
a variety of concessions and trade-offs in other debated issues regarding the whole package, 
such as Climate Change.
According to the results of the case study and one of the main notions of liberal intergovernmen-
talism (that the international policy agenda is generally determined by the positions, preferences 
and national interests of the great powers), it can be noted that one of the main coalitions during 
the process of negotiation was composed of the most powerful Member States, i.e., Germany, 
the UK and France. As a result of the cooperation of these three great powers and their allies, the 
mechanism of Guarantees of Origin was essentially eliminated from the final text of the Directive, 
retaining only a symbolic function of a formal instrument proving the renewable origin of energy. 
From the perspective of liberal intergovernmentalism, the pattern of coalition-forming is suffi-
ciently clear during the process of negotiation on the Directive 2009/28/EC, considering the three 
great powers of the EU. Consequently, this denies the basic provisions as well as tendencies of su-
pranational federalism, as it demonstrates the importance of national interests and the bargaining 
power of the Member States in the processes of intergovernmental negotiations on the prospects 
of European integration. On the other hand, in terms of the outcomes of the negotiation, it can be 
noted that the assumptions of the (neo)fuctionalist theory regarding the supranational consensus, 
European integration by various spill-overs as well as harmonization of national policies are clearly 
limited by the Member States’ preferences and their vital national interests which distinctly adjust 
the proposals of supranational institutions, i.e., the European Commission.
The Scandinavian countries, which essentially opposed the proposal on the mechanism of Guaran-
tees of Origin as a common EU-wide support scheme for renewables, together with Estonia, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, Belgium, Poland and other Member States should also be perceived as 
the “winners” of the negotiation, as they reached a significant victory after safeguarding their spe-
cific national support schemes. Conversely, Italy, Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Hungary, which 
expressed their support for the common support scheme, can be identified as the “losers”.
While analyzing the aforementioned coalitions of the Member States, it can be noted that none of 
them clearly meet the criteria for the distinction between the so-called new Member States, which 
joined the EU in 2004 and afterwards, and the old Member States. It is also worth adding that a clear 
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distinction between coalitions in terms of regional or geographical position, size and political or 
economic power does not exist either. In this case, the conclusion can be drawn that this distinction 
is based on the postulates of liberal intergovernmentalist theory, that the formation of certain coa-
litions during intergovernmental negotiations is determined more by the national preferences and 
economic interests of the Member States than their size, geographical position, etc.
The Member States composing the aforementioned coalitions during the process of negotiation 
have different potential and energy mix of renewables, maintain different models and practices in 
the renewable energy sector as well as different support schemes, etc. Therefore, their national 
interests as well as bargaining positions reflect a certain degree of heterogeneity and some mis-
match over the “old vs. new Member States” distinction. As a result, the coalitions of the Member 
States, namely over the issue of a common EU-wide support scheme, can be regarded to be of 
ad hoc nature.
The results of the case study revealed the energy integration disparities across the EU. 
The most powerful EU Member States, particularly Germany, France and the UK, have engaged 
in the implementation of green policies as well as in active participation in the global Climate 
Change Regime. On the other hand, these Member States are facing an active public advocacy 
for renewables as well as pressures from the renewable energy lobby groups seeking policy 
continuity safeguards from national authorities.
Germany should be perceived as one of the biggest “winners” of the negotiation, as it might 
reasonably be seen as a constructive pusher or even a unilateral policy maker, taking the agen-
da-shaping role in the process of negotiation (Dzionara, 2014). Germany played a key role in 
the negotiation process and is currently characterized as one of the renewable energy leaders 
across the Globe. In the context of the negotiation process, Germany can be considered as the 
constructive pusher whose presidency in 2007 was essential for adopting the 20 percent target 
for renewables at the EU-level. Germany was also one of the few Member States which has 
managed to implement the previous (not legally binding) targets at the national level by ensuring 
the necessary conditions for renewable energy development (Sokolov, 2011). Germany’s role as 
a constructive pusher in the negotiations process on the Directive was determined by its course 
of domestic policy patterns, such as strengthening economic and political positions in environ-
mental policy with regard to Climate Change prevention and the rapid development of renewable 
energy as well as a long-term favorable attitude of the ruling coalitions to green policies, with 
the continuity of Chancellor G.Schroeder’s policy by his successor A.Merkel (Ibid.). As the largest 
emitter of the CO2 emissions in the EU (and the sixth in the world), Germany is very strongly com-
mitted to the development of the green agenda at the EU level as well as to the global Climate 
Change Regime, actively implementing the Kyoto protocol (Ibid.). Therefore, the maintenance of 
the national feed-in tariff support scheme during the negotiation on the Directive was an import-
ant task for Germany, as the feed-in tariff stimulates renewable energy development, which in 
turn significantly contributes to Climate Change prevention.
Although the share of UK’s renewable energy sources was one of the lowest in the EU during the 
time of negotiation on the Directive, precisely because it relied strongly on nuclear energy as well 
as on oil and gas reserves in the North Sea, it also supported the 20 percent overall EU target and 
showed reluctance regarding the common support scheme for all the Member States. However, 
unlike the Scandinavian countries which have carried out their national policies for developing 
more renewable energy, the UK focused on the importance of Climate Change prevention and 
the commitments to the global Climate Change Regime under the Kyoto protocol (Ibid.).
Even though France also largely relies on nuclear energy, it also supported the 20 percent overall 
EU renewable energy target. In 2002, French Ministry of Economy organized the first large-scale 
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national debate on the topic of energy, the results of which showed that approximately 70 percent 
of the population had very low knowledge of energy, while the other part showed strong interest 
in energy-related issues (ViePublieque.fr, 2005). Therefore, the so-called White Paper was ad-
opted as a result of the debate which highlighted the prospects of the legal regulation of energy 
sector in three areas, namely energy efficiency, diversification of energy supply and significant 
increase in renewables (Sokolov, 2011). According to these provisions, the 23 percent target for 
renewables in final energy consumption was introduced as well as the 50 percent increase in the 
use of renewable sources in the heating sector since 2020 (Ibid.). Like the UK, France has also 
assumed the high international commitments in combating Climate Change under the provi-
sions of the Kyoto Protocol.
The Scandinavian Member States are universally recognized as the pioneers and leaders in the 
field of renewable energy, fostering a single energy market as well as efficient renewable energy 
policies, although these policies are based on different principles, support schemes and renew-
able energy sources. For example, Denmark is currently one of the leaders in the EU’s renewable 
energy sector and the largest producer of renewable energy technologies who has begun ex-
ploiting its national renewable energy potential (especially wind energy) since the oil crisis of the 
seventies. It has been further developing the electricity transmission network by expanding it to 
the neighboring countries, increasing the export of renewable energy technologies threefold by 
the end of 20th century, and committing to achieve a complete energy independence from fossil 
fuels as well as 30 percent of renewables in the final energy consumption by 2020 (Ibid.). Estonia 
should also be attributed to Scandinavian countries in the respect of renewables, for, according to 
the evaluation of the progress in reaching the interim renewable energy targets, Estonia is doing 
very well as it follows the plan in a timely manner (Spitzley, et al, 2014).
Southern European Member States, specifically Spain and Portugal, are one of the leaders at 
the EU-level and around the Globe in terms of wind energy production. They also share a com-
mon goal to connect their electricity transmission infrastructure with other EU Member States, 
especially France, as it would help them to further increase the renewable electricity producti-
on by exploiting potential export opportunities (EurActiv, 2014). Therefore, the protection of the 
national feed-in tariffs, most favorable for a steady development of renewable energy, was an 
important issue for Spain and Portugal during the process of negotiation.
Assessing the composition of the “loser” coalition in the negotiation, it can be noted that it 
largely consists of the so-called new EU Member States and Italy. Italy can be characterized 
as the Member State with a unique energy situation within the region of Southern Europe. It 
still tends to strongly rely on energy from fossil fuels and most of its oil and gas imports is 
based on long-term contracts (Dinmore, 2013). Unlike Spain or Portugal, Italy has never been 
a leader in the renewable energy sector. On the other hand, it is often noted that the Italian 
energy policy is short-sighted, lacking a comprehensive approach as well as a clear direc-
tion. It is usually emphasized that during its EU presidency in 2014 Italy failed to effectively 
coordinate the common energy policy issues and to solve the climate crisis-related questions 
(Colantoni, 2015). It is also easy to see that the three “losers” of the negotiations, i.e., Bulgaria, 
Slovakia and Hungary, have strongly relied on nuclear energy since the Soviet era or even 
implement new nuclear energy projects. Another new Member State, Lithuania, showed a 
strong reluctance regarding the decommissioning of Ignalina nuclear power plant according to 
the requirements set by the EU authorities for joining the EU. Moreover, Lithuania is not ready 
to abandon its nuclear state ambitions as it still plans to develop the Visaginas nuclear power 
plant project, with the intention to maintain the continuity of energy policy based on the reli-
ance on nuclear power, even while facing pressures from the non-governmental sector and the 
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public. The later post-Soviet nuclear energy discourse as well as the ambitions to maintain the 
historically inherited centralized energy systems reflect the phenomenon of the so-called path 
dependency, when certain domestic policies, decisions or practices are based on the political 
or economic legacy, relying on historically determined knowledge and reasoning.
 _ A case study of the negotiation process on 
the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin as 
the common EU-wide support scheme for 
renewables in the Directive 2009/28/EC to-
gether with an analysis of Member States’ 
position papers were carried out in this article. 
The results of the case study showed that the 
negotiation process and the bargaining posi-
tions of the Member States are determined by 
their economic interests. The opposition to a 
common support scheme very similar to the 
quota or green certificate support scheme by 
the Member States which apply feed-in tariffs 
can justify this assumption. The intensity of 
the negotiation process depends on whether 
and how much the debated issue is relevant 
to the national energy and/or economic inter-
ests of the Member States, which essentially 
reflects the basic notions of liberal intergov-
ernmentalism. The majority of the Member 
States demonstrated a strong opposition to 
the Commission’s proposal for harmoniz-
ing their renewable energy policies through 
a specific pan-European support scheme, 
i.e., the mechanism of Guarantees of Origin. 
The Commission’s initiative was rejected by 
posing an argument that the instruments for 
reaching renewable energy targets must be 
selected according to the principal of subsid-
iarity with respect to each Member State’s 
national specifics, as only then the renewable 
energy support schemes could function in the 
most sufficient and effective manner. 
 _ The Commission‘s initial proposal had to 
be significantly modified, which resulted in 
abandoning the idea of an EU-level support 
scheme for renewables. The findings also 
verify the theoretical assumptions based on 
liberal intergovernmentalism which postu-
late that the negotiation’s outcomes depend 
primarily on asymmetric bargaining power 
and the preferences of the most powerful 
Member States, determined by their na-
tional specifics, support schemes and oth-
er domestic factors. On the other hand, the 
case study of the international negotiation 
process on the mechanism of Guarantees 
of Origin sets aside the (neo)functionalist 
theoretical assumptions that integration is 
largely determined by the supranational lev-
el initiatives, since the European Commis-
sion’s initiatives were significantly adjusted 
and even rejected by the Member States 
during the process of intergovernmental 
negotiation. Therefore, supranational con-
sensus and the Commission’s efforts to 
harmonize the Member States’ renewable 
energy support schemes actually remain 
unaccomplished. Consequently, the energy 
integration as a result of intergovernmen-
tal negotiations is likely to emerge only to a 
certain degree, until the initiatives of supra-
national institutions, i.e., the Commission, 
are not contradictory to the national inter-
ests of Member States.
 _ The case study also revealed that domes-
tic policy issues, characterized by such na-
tional factors as the potential of particular 
renewable energy sources and other types 
of specific parameters, determine nation-
al preferences and bargaining positions of 
the Member States, which are uploaded on 
the policy agenda on an international level 
during the process of negotiation. The dis-
tinction between Member States’ domestic 
policy patterns on renewables, reflected in 
their bargaining positions, demonstrates the 
energy integration disparities across the EU. 
 _ The most powerful EU Member States, par-
ticularly Germany, France and the UK, tend-
ed to successfully coordinate their positions 
without undermining their national inter-
ests during the process of negotiation. This 
provides positive stimulus for the common 
EU renewable energy policy, considering 
that the Member States which successful-
Conclusions
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ly upload their national interests on the EU 
agenda in the policy-making phase of inter-
governmental negotiation will be inclined to 
effectively download the provisions of the 
common EU policy, formed as a result of 
the negotiation process, to transpose the 
latter provisions into their national law and 
to implement them in an efficient manner.
 _ On the other hand, the Member States which 
failed to upload their national interests during 
the negotiation process may be tempted not 
to download, transpose or implement com-
mon EU renewable energy policy. Although 
the negotiation process resulted in an inter-
national compromise and a reconcilement 
of national interests with the consent of the 
so-called lowest common denominator by 
applying certain concessions and trade-offs, 
the Member States in favor of a common re-
newable energy support scheme, such as Ita-
ly, Bulgaria, Hungary and others, may still be 
perceived as the “losers”.
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